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only say that our space forbade it, and that we have said all that
we deemed it prudent or proper to say, at the time, upon this
whole subject, in the work named at the beginning of our article.
I. F. R.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of

New York.
PHILIP ALLEN ET AL., vs. F. SCHUCHARDT ET AL.
S, acting for parties at Amsterdam, put into the hands of a broker in the city of
New York a sample bottle of a quantity of madder, to negotiate a sale. The
sale was made in Rhode Island. by the broker, in the name of S., the foreign
principal not being disclosed, under an oral contract to A., upon the inspection
of the sample bottle, which he refused to open on account of the instructions of S.
The madder was, at the time of the sale, in barrels, in a vessel at the port of
New York. After the contract was made, a bill of goods was furnished to the
purchasers, with a clause, that "no claims for deficiencies shall be allowed unless
made within seven days from receipt of goods." The madder in the casks
proving inferior to its apparent qualities in the bottle, an action on the case was
brought against S., by the purchasers, for damages.
Heldi-1. The oral contract made in Rhode Island, where the statute of frauds does
not prevail, can be enforced here, although the contract, if made in the same
manner in New York, would have been void. The fact that the merchandise
was in New York does not affect the question.
2. The action on the case is a proper remedy, and it is not necessary to aver a
zcienter.
3. The sale was by sample, and there was an implied warranty that the merchandise should correspond with the apparent qualities of the sample.
4. The clause in the bill of goods respecting deficiencies, is inoperative, as the
contract was previously complete.
5. S.not having disclosed his principals, is personally liable.

Before NELSON, C. J., and

SHIPMAN,

J.

The sample of a quantity of madder was put into the hands of a
broker in the city of New York, by the defendants, to make sale of
it for them. A sale was made accordingly to the plaintiffs in the
State of Rhode Island, upon an inspection of the sample bottle,
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which the broker refused to open on account of instructions from
his principals. The sample bottle had been forwarded from Amsterdam to the defendants, previous to the shipment of the bulk,
and was the only sample of the goods, as none accompanied them.
The madder was in barrels, in the vessel, which had arrived in New
York, about the time of the sale. The sale was made in the name
of the defendants, their principals not being disclosed.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
NELSON, C. J.-I. The contract of sale in this case was made in
Rhode Island, and, though verbal, is there valid, as no sale note
is required, as in our statute of frauds. The madder, the subject
of the sale, being in New York, or elsewhere, at the time, does
not affect this question.'
II. The action on the case for a false warranty, is certainly a
somewhat antiquated remedy, the action of assumpsit having taken
its place; yet we cannot say that it has been abolished or modified
on account of the substitution, by the profession, of the new remedy.
There are certain advantages to be gained by the adoption of the
one or the other, which are not common to both, and, in a count
upon a false warranty, the pleader need not aver the scienter any
more than in that of assumpsit. 1 Wh. Selwyn, p. 486; 2 East,
446; 2 Chitty P1., p. 101, N. P. 276-7; 1 ib. 139.2
III. The sale of the madder was a sale by sample, where the
purchaser had no opportunity to examine the bulk; and where he
was prohibited by the vendors from opening the sample bottle for
the purpose of examining the article, by which act we are inclined
to think they assumed the responsibility of maintaining that the
bulk was equal to the quality of the article as it appeared to the
eye in the bottle. The sale was not only by sample, but was
obviously intended to be such by the vendors, as the sample of the
madder preceded the arrival of the bulk from abroad, and no
sample accompanied it. The sample thus previously forwarded
was put into the hands of the broker to sell the one hundred
barrels subsequently shipped. This sample thus forwarded was
the only one furnished representing this quantity of madder.
I See

Note 1, post.

2 See Note 2, post.
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IV. The sale being a sale by sample, there was an implied warranty3 that the bulk was equal to the sample in quality, which,
upon the evidence in the case, it clearly was not. All agree
that, from an inspection of the sample, the madder appeared
to be pure and unadulterated. From a careful analysis of the
bulk by chemists, there was an adulteration, by sand and other
foreign substances, exceeding thirty per cent. This evidence preponderates over the weight of the testimony abroad, taken on
commission. There was no analysis of the article abroad.
V. The note at the head. of the bill of goods rendered "no
claims for deficiencies or imperfections allowed, unless made within
seven days from receipt of goods," was not binding upon the purchasers. The contract was complete and binding upon both parties before this bill was delivered.
The case is an unfortunate one) as both parties are innocent,
the fraud having been perpetrated abroad before the goods were
shipped to the defendants, who were mere consignees. The. question is, which of these innocent parties, under the facts disclosed,
should suffer the loss? The question turns upon a dry rule of law,
and, according to my idea of it, the plaintiffs are entitled to the
judgment.'
The verdict of $10,000 was taken by consent, subject to adjustment and the opinion of the Court upon a case made. I shall
deduct thirty per cent. from the price paid for the madder, as furnishing the amount of damages in the case, and give judgment
for plaintiff for that sum.
(1.) The familiar principle in this class
of cases is, "that so much of the law
as affects the rights and merits of the contract, is adopted from the foreign country; so much of the law as affects the
remedy only, is taken from the local law
of the country where the action is
brought." Does the StatutW of Frauds
affect the contract or the remedy? It
has been held in England, after an extended and elaborate discussion, that the
fourth section of the statute affects the
3 See Note 3, post.

remedy, and consequently that an oral
agreement within that section, made in
France, and valid there, cannot be enforced in England. Leroux vs. Brown,
12 C. B. 800; S. C. 14 Eng. L. Eq. 247,
(1852.) The court rests its decision upon
the special language of that section:
"No action shall be brought upon any
agreement which is not to be performed
within a year, &c., unless the agreement
upon which such action shall be brought
or some memorandum or note thereof
4See Note 4, post.
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shall be in writing," &c. The construc- not then prevailed above forty years, and
tion placed upon this language was, that *was adopted in order to add the money
the words, "no action shall be brought," counts to the declaration. The right to
evidently regarded the remedy, and the declare in assumpsit on an express waralternative clause showed that the writ- ranty, was frst discussed and decided in
ing was required only for the purposes Douglas, 18, (1778.) The distinction asto
of evidence. There were dicta to the the necessity of alleging a scienter is that
effect that such a construction would not if the action is on a warranty, it is not
be given to the seventeenth section, re- necessary, but if it be in the nature of
garding sales of goods. These dicta an action of deceit, without any warwere followed in 1855, by the Supreme ranty,scienter mustbe alleged and proved:
Court of Missouri, in Houghtaling vs. Note to Williamson vs. Allison, supra;
Ball, 20 Miss. (5 Bennett), 563. The Stone vs. Denny, 4 Metcalf, 151 ; 5
court expressly decides that an oral con- B. & A., 797; Bayard vs. Malcolm, 1
tract for the sale of goods, made in a Johnson, 453. The right to bring an
state where the Statute of Frauds does action on the case, for breach of warnot prevail, can be enforced in Missouri, ranty, is fully recognised in this counwhere the statute exists substantially in try, among other cases, in 30 Maine,
the language of the English seventeenth* 170; 3 Vermont, 53; 20 Conn., 271;
section. Browne, in his work on the Sta- 4 Blackf. 293. An important advantage
tute of Frauds, p. 140, note 5,(ed. 1857,) may sometimes be secured in joining a
disapproves of the distinction, citing dicta count for fraudulent misrepresentation
in Carrington vs. Roots, 2 M. & W. 248; with the count on an express warranty,
Reade vs. Lamb, 6 W. H. & G. Exch. 130. and a recovery thus may he had in acThe Missouri case, however, was not be- cordance with the evidence. A judgfore him, and the principal case is in the ment will, it seems, be a bar to an action
same direction. There is no distinction of assumpsit on the warranty: 23 Pick.
in the present New York Statute of 256.
Frauds, between the two classes of sub(3.) In determining whether a sale
jects, and the decision would embrace is by sample or not, a material inquiry
all the sections. In Dacosta vs. Davis, is, whether the article is open for in4 Zabriskie, 319, the authorities are col- spection. It is a reasonable rule, where
lected in reference to the question whe- it is not present and a sample is exther the absence of the goods affects the hibited, that the sale should be treated
law of the place of contract. In this as being by sample.
case a contract was made in New Jersey,
The correspondence of the sample
for the sale of goods at the time in Penn- with the article, is the essence of the
sylvania. The court arrived at the con- contract, and the purchaser may say, if
clusions reached in the present case.
this correspondence does not exist, non
(2.) The old rule was that all actions in hoc fcedera veni: Boorman vs. Johnupon a warranty, whether express or im- ston, 12 Wend. 576; Salisbury vs. Steiplied, were actions on the case. As to ner, 19 Wend. 159; 1 Smith Lead. Cas.
implied warranties, see Keilwey, 91.
77; note to Chandelor vs. Lopus. This
Lord Ellenborough, in the case of principle is in like manner true of a
Williamson vs. Allison, 2 East, 446, written contract for articles of a particu(1802,) says, that the form of declaring lar name not open to inspection: Wieler
in assumpsit in cases of warranty, had vs. Schilizzi, 17 C. B. 617.
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(4.) The defendants were liable, not
When the article and sample are both
apen to the purchaser, the same princi- having disclosed their correspondents,
te does not necessarily prevail. There on well settled principles of law. If
must be an agreement to sell by sample, they had disclosed their principals, the
or at least an understanding of the par- question would have been raised, wheties that the sale is to be a sale by sample: ther, as foreign factors, the presumpWaring vs. MIason, 18 Wend. 434. The tion of law is that the dealing was exquestion can only be answered by a view clusively with them. This doctrine,
of all the circumstances of each case, which was advanced by Judge Story,
and the intention of the parties must be (Agency, see. 268, and note 290, 423,)
gathered from their acts. It is a ques- was combated, 2 Kent Com. 630, 631;
tion of intention, and must be submitted 22 Wend. 244; disapproved and disto the jury. The evidence must be suffi- carded in Green vs. Kopke, 18 0. B., 548,
cient, from which the jury can find that (1856,) and in 0elricks vs. Ford, 23
the sale was intended to be a sale by How. U. S., 49, (1859,) Nelson, 3., desample: Beirne vs. Dord, 1 Selden, 95; livering the opinion of the court. The
Hargous vs. Stone, 1 Selden, 73. An question is one of intention, to be gathexhibition of a sample in such case, ered fromh surrounding circumstances,
without anything more, is only a repre- such as usage, &c. The fact that the
sentation that it has been taken fairly principals were foreigners, might be an
from the bulk of the commodity: 1Th. element in reaching the conclusion.
In case of a technical sale by sample, Jervis, C. J., in Green vs. Kopke; Coleif the article is not equal to the sample,, ridge, J.,in .Mahony vs. Kekul6, 5 Elthe contract may be rescinded or the lis & Black., pp. 125, 130. See Heald vs.
merchandise may be retained and an Kenworthy, 10 Exch. 739. "The quesaction for damages be brought: 2 Kent's tion is one of fact and not of law,"
oiom., 481; Story on Contracts, 540; Parke, B. I The doctrine itself was only
authorities collected by Jewett, J. 1 extended to goods sold by oral contract.
Bray vs. Kettell, 1 Allen (Mass.,) 80,
Seld., 99.
The question decided in this case, that (1861,) per Bigelow, C. 3. Where there
the merchandise must, under the facts is a written contract, properly executed
proved, correspond with the appearance by an agent, as if signed "A. B., princiof the sample, and not simply with its pal, by C. D., agent," and the language
real qualities, is of the first impression. is unambiguous, a foreign factor is no
The vendor may be regarded as estopped more liable than a domestic factor,.
from denying that the apparent and ac- S.C.
T. W. D.
tual qualities of the goods were different.
2
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In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1861.
JEPTHA KILLAM VS. GEORGE KILLAM.
1. An estate already descended cannot be divested from the legal heirs, and given
to the bastard child of an intestate, by a subsequent statute of legitimation; but
the legislature may cure the taint of a bastard's blood for the purpose of future
inheritance.
2. By an act of the Legislature, passed in 1853, it was provided that George W. K.,
son, and Emily M., daughter of George K., shall have and enjoy all the rights
and privileges, benefits and advantages of children born in lawful wedlock, and
shall be able to inherit and transact any estate whatsoever, as fully and completely to all intents and purposes, as if they had been born in lawful wedlock."
The persons named were children of George K., in point of fact, by the same
mother, who, after their birth, but before the passage of the act, had been married to a third person, X. At the date of the act all parties were living. George
W. died in 1859, unmarried, and without issue, seised of land which had been
conveyed to him by his father. In an ejeetment by the father against a grantee
of X. and his wife: Held, that the effect of the act of 1853, was to remove, for
all purposes of inheritance, the defect of blood of the children, as though, at the
time of their birth, their parents had been lawfully married; that the land
passed, under the intestate laws of this State, to his natural parents for their
joint lives, notwithstanding that the mother was then still the wife of X., remainder to his natural sister, Emily M., in fee; and therefore that the father
was entitled to recover, but only as to an equal moiety of the land.
3. Held, also, that the case was not affected by the general law of 1855, which
provides that the estate of a bastard, dying unmarried and without issue, shall
pass to his mother absolutely.
4. H dd, further, that the fact that the conveyance of the land in question to George
W. K., by his father, was expressed to be in consideration of natural love and
affection, was not-material.

Error to Common Pleas of Wayne county.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
WOODWARD, J.-The reason why a bastard cannot inherit, by
the common law, is because he is the son of nobody. Having no
ancestor, his blood possesses no inheritable quality; though in
respect of his own children, it has the usual descendible quality
of pure blood. But a bastard may be made legitimate and capable of inheriting, says Blackstone, and 4th Inst. 86, by the transcendant power of an act of Parliament, and not otherwise, as
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was done in the case of John Gaunt's bastard children by a statute
of Richard IL We have on our statute books acts of legitimation
without number. Because our constitution is silent on the subject, the legislative power is plenary. I am not aware that it has
ever been questioned. An estate that has already descended to
the legal heir cannot be divested and given to the bastard by a
subsequent act of legitimation; but that the taint of his blood
may be cured for the purposes of future inheritance by the healing
touch of the legislature, is not to be doubted. It is not so questionable an exercise of power as the restoration of inheritable
blood by the reversal of an attainder for treason'; for the corruption there proceeds from disloyalty to the State, which is a much
more grievous offence than fornication.
The business now in hand, however, is not to vindicate the
legislative power to restore bastards, but to interpret an act of
legitimation. In 1853 the legislature enacted, "that George W.
Killam, son, and Emily Miles, daughter, of George Killam, of
Wayne county, shall have and enjoy all the rights and privileges,
benefits and advantages of children born in lawful wedlock, and
shall be able and capable in law to inherit and transmit any estate
whatsoever, as fully and completely, to all intents and purposes,
as if they had been born in lawful wedlock."
These are very large enabling words. The very definition of a
legitimate person is one born in lawful wedlock, and whatever
capacities to inherit or transmit an estate such a person possessed
in 1853, or should acquire thereafter, were to belong to George W.
Killam, and to be among his "rights, privileges, benefits, and
advantages." So much is clear. But lawful wedlock with whom?
The mother of George W. and Emily is not mentioned or referred
to in the enactment. Whether they were children of the same
mother, and who was the mother of either or both, the legislature
seems not to have known or inquired. They meant undoubtedly
that the children should have the same legal capacities as if their
father had been at their birth the lawful husband of their mother,
and it is fortunate that the construction of the act is rendered
easier by the ascertained fact that they had a common mother.
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Elizabeth Tyler was the mother of both. They were both born
before 1821. After their birth, but long before the act of 1853,
their mother was married to Nathaniel Tyler, and both she and
the father, George Killam, survive both children. Emily married,
and died in 1860, leaving a husband and three minor children.
George W. died intestate in 1859, unmarried, and without issue,
seized in fee simple of two hundred and eighty acres of land, the
subject of the present controversy. In 1860, Tyler and wife conveyed the land to Jeptha Killam, with a full notice that it was
claimed both by the father, George Killam, and by the. sister,
Emily Miles, then still alive. This ejectment was brought by
George Killam, the father of the bastard, against Jeptha, the purchaser, from the mother of the bastards, and upon this state of
facts the court so construed the act of 1853, as to give the judgment and the land to the plaintiff.
The necessity of defining the exact effect of the act of 1853,
is shown by our general intestate laws, which provide for the
succession to the estates of intestate children, whether they be
legitimate or illegitimate. If legitimate, the real estate, by the
3d section of the act of 8th April, 1833, relative to intestates,
goes to the father and mother of the intestate child during their
joint lives and the life of the survivor; and by the 5th section to
them in fee simple, "in default of issue, and brothers and sisters
of the whole blood and their descendants." If the descendant be
an illegitimate, then by the 3d section of the act of 27th April,
1855, his real estate goes to his mother in fee simple.
Was George W. legitimate or illegitimate, when he died in
1859? That depends on the effect of the act of 1853. If legitimate, then his father and mother, both being alive, take a joint
estate for life in his lands, and his sister, being of full blood, took
the remainder in fee, which at her death descended to her heirs.
If,on the other hand, he was illegitimate, then under the act of
1855, his mother took the whole in fee simple.
The learned judge must have thought, as the counsel for the defendant in error argues, that after the act of 1853 the children
ceased to be illegitimate only as "between theirfather and them-
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selves." Notwithstanding the full and strong terms of that legislation, counsel will not agree that it legitimated the children any
further than as concerned the one parent. To concede that it
legitimated them as to both parents, would admit the mother to a
joint inheritance. The immediate effect of such a qualified construction of the act must be to leave them illegitimate as to the
mother, and then the act of 1855 brings her in. The only answer
which the counsel make to the act of 1855 is, that George W.
Killam was not, at its passage, of the class to which it applied.
He had been created, say they, the legitimate son of his father by
legislative enactment. He had been taken out of the inferior
class of illegitimate, "and clothed with all the civil rights of the
superior class of legitimate children."
The argument is manifestly felo de se. You kill your first position of a qualified or half legitimation, by your second, which invests the children with all the civil rights of legitimacy. The
question here is not one of inheritance, but of transmission.
George W. might have controlled the direction his estate should
take by a will, but he elected to leave it to the transmission of
the intestate laws. He must be presumed to have known what
they were.
It is a truism, too simple to need more than mere assertion, that
for the purposes of the intestate acts he must have been either legitimate or illegitimate. They provide for no mongrels or hybrids.
Then let it be said that he was legitimate, that though not born in
lawful wedlock, the transcendant power of the legislature has made
him equal to a son born in lawful wedlock, that though his mother
was not ascertained or mentioned by the legislature, she is fully
identified by the parties litigant, and her maternity admitted in the
record before us, and, therefore, that in legal judgment she should
be recognised as entitled to a joint life estate with the defendant
in error in the decedent's lands. What is the objection to this? It
may be said it is giving undue effect to the act of 1853-that it is
virtually making wedlock betwixt a man and a woman who is married to another man-that if the bastards had had several mothers,
it would be marrying Killam to each of them, and that it estab-
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lishes inheritable blood betwixt a brother and sister, as well as
between a father and his children. Let all these consequences be
accepted, and what do they amount to ? 1Notwithstanding Mrs.
Tyler's present wedlock, she might have been Killam's lawful wife
when these children were born. The legislature were not necessarily guilty of an historical untruth, or even of an anachronism, in
enacting that she was. A divorce would have qualified her for the
second marriage. How do we know that these children were not
born in lawful wedlock, the legislature having said they were?
How can we impeach the union between the parents, whatever it
was, since the legislature has made' it lawful? And why should
not the act be construed to make George and Emily brother and
sister ? It is judicially ascertained that they were children of the
same father and mother, and they have been legislatively declared
legitimate. They then were in law, as in fact, brother and sister
of the full blood. As to the embarrassment which would be upon
us if they had happened to have been born of different mothers,
sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. That question is not
before us, and it shall not distress us.
The other construction of the act of 1853, that which qualifies
the legitimacy granted, is not free from greater difficulties. It is
opposed to the terms of the enactment, which is sufficient to set it
aside. We have seen that the words used by the legislature were
large enough to confer all the civil rights of legitimacy, and as it
was a remedial and a humane law, it ought not to be cramped in
the construction. But again; the intestate laws cannot be administered on the theory of a partial legitimacy. This is apparent
enough from what has been already said. It is to be observed
that when they admit the mother to the inheritance of a deceased
child, whether a legitimate or illegitimate, they admit her not as
the wife of the father, but as mother. It is of no moment, therefore, that Mrs. Tyler is not Killam's wife, since he confesses her
to be the mother of his children. In that maternal character she
takes under the intestate law. If the act of 1853 was intended
for the very special purpose supposed by counsel, of establishing
relations between the father and son in respect to the land in ques-
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tion, how do they account for Emily being embraced in it, between
whom and her father there were no transactions in land?
In view of the difficulties of both constructions, we think it more
congenial to the spirit of our intestate laws, and more honorable to
the motives of all parties, to impute to the act of 1853, not the
narrow and inconsistent purpose contended for, but the more generous intent of eradicating all manner of taint from the blood of
both George and Emily, and compelling the world to treat them,
for all purposes, as legitimate. The consequence is, that George
could transmit and Emily could inherit under the intestate laws as
if no defect had ever existed.
We see nothing to change our judgment in the fact that this land
was conveyed to George W. by his father for a consideration of
natural love and affection. He held it as a purchaser, and at his
death the fee simple descended to his sister, subject to a life estate
of his father and mother for their joint lives, and the life of the
survivor. By her the mother's conveyance to Jeptha Killam took
what she held, and no more, an'd, therefore, the judgment should
have been for the plaintiff below, not for the whole, but for a joint
undivided moiety of the premises.
The judgment is reversed, and judgment is now entered here in
favor of George Killam, the plaintiff below and defendant in error,
for an undivided moiety of the land mentioned in the writ.
STIONG,

J., dissents.

One of the most difficult questions in
constitutional jurisprudence, is as to the
extent to which civil rights may be affected by retrospective legislation. The fact
that neither in the Constitution of the
United States, nor in most of thosq in
the separate States, is there any express
provision to guarantee them against
such interference, has often been observed upon with surprise. While personal liberty and personal security, and
the obligation of contracts are guarded
with care, other rights are left to depend
to a great degree for their protection,

upon what is at best but vague and
doubtful language. As the right of privatd property is one of the chief bases of
civil society, it might naturally have
been expected that some clear and emphatic prohibition against legislation
which should impair its integrity, would
have found a prominent place in the organic laws of a congeries of republics.
Even in the Code Napoleon, in which no
great jealousy of the sovereign authority
is to be expected, it is declared at the
very outset: "La loi ne dispose queyour
P'avenir; elle n'a point d'effet retroactif."
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(Cod. Civ. Tit. Prel., Art. I., Sect. 2.)
And, while in the Roman jaw no limit
could be admitted in practice, to the arbitrary power of the Prince, still, in
theory, it was always received as a fundamental maxim, Leges et contitutiones
futuri certum est dare formam negotiis,
non adfacta preeterita revocari.
Whether the absence of any general
prohibition against the disturbadce of
private rights in our constitutions, is to
be attributed to the same cause which
made the Roman laws silent on the subjectof parricide, becauseitwasnot deemed wise to admit the possibility of such
a crime, or to an inherent difficulty in
determining the just limits of retroactive
legislation, it is not easy to say. It is
certain that among the restrictions fixed
by the constitution of the United States
upon the powers of the States, there is
none which prevents the passage of retrospective laws, however unjust or impolitic, except only where they would
affect some existing contract, or attach
to some previous act penal consequences,
which it did possess when committed,
for this is the only sense in which the
expression Ie postfacto law" is to be received. Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dallas, 388;
Satterlee vs. Matthewson, 2 Peters, 413;
Wilkinson vs. Leland, Id. 661 ; Watson
vs. Mercer, 8 Peters, 110; Charles River
Bridge vs. WarrenBridge, 11 Peters, 539;
Carpenter vs. Comm., 17 How. U. S.463;
Bennett vs. Boggs, Baldwin C. C. 174.
The self imposed limitations of the State
constitutions are of course more extensive
than this, but still, as a general proposition, the mere fact that a law is made to
operate on past transactions, is not, by
itself, sufficient to render it unconstitutional. Calder vs. Bull, 2 Root, 350;
Comm. vs. Lewis, 6 Binn. 271; Schenley
vs. Comm., 36 Penn. St. 57; String vs.
State, 1 Blackf. 196; Fisher vs. Cockcrill, 5 Monr. 133; Davis vs. Ballard,

1 J. J. Marsh, 578; Locke vs. Dane,
9 Mass. 360; Oriental Bank vs. Freese,
18 Maine, 112; Wilson vs. Hardesty,
1 Maryl. Ch. 66; Goshen vs. Stonington,
4 Conn. 218; Lockett vs. Usry, 28 Gee.
349. Even if it could be considered to
this extent, as a violation of the principles of natural justice, a court could have
no power, on that ground alone, to declare it void: Comm. vs. MeClosky,
2 Rawle, 514; Lord vs. Chadbourne, 42
Maine, 441. But retrospective legislation, so far from being a necessary infraction of those principles, may often operate in furtherance of equity, good
morals, and social order, and where it
does so, will generally be sustained, if
obnoxious to no express constitutional
restriction: Trustees of Cayuga Falls,
&c., Academy vs. M'Caughy, 2 Ohio St.,
N. S. 152; Goshen vs. Stonington, 4
Conn. 218; Savings Bank vs. Allen, 28
Conn. 102. Indeed, in those States where
such legislation has been prohibited in
terms, the constitutional provision has
received a judicial construction which
deprives itof almost any specialvalue, by
admitting in practice, substantially the
same exceptions, as are elsewhere allowed as qualifications of a mere principle of political justice: Merrill vs. Sherburne, 1 New Hamp. 199; Woart vs.
Winnee, 3 Id. 474; Clark vs. Clark, 10
N. H. 386; Gilman vs. Cutts, 23 Id.
(3 Foster) 382; Willard vs. Harvey, 24
Id. (4 Fost.) 344; Rich vs. Flanders, 39
N. H. 313; Hog e vs. Johnson, 2 Yerg.
125; Vansant vs. Waddell, Id. 260; Brandon vs. Green, 7 Hump. 130 ; Society vs.
Wheeler, 2 Gallison, 139; De Cordova
vs. City of Galveston, 4 Texas, 477.
In determining, then, the validity of
a legislative act, something more is usually to be looked at, than its effect on
past transactions. In fact, the test will
be found to be, in general, not whether
the particular statute is or is not retro-
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spective in its language; but whether it
affects injuriously pre-existent rights of
property. It must be observed, that the
word "injuriously" is used here in its
proper sense, as involving the idea of
hurt or damage, not sanctioned or excused by any established rule of law or
morals. For there are many ways in
whichrights ofproperty maybe abridged
by legislative action, which, as possessing such sanction or excuse, is free from
constitutional objection. Thus, in the
exercise of what is commonly called the
right of eminent domain, (for want of a
better name,) the State, through its legislature, may impair, qualify, or destroy private property fora public benefit or to prevent a public injury. This
right of eminent domain, which, like the
right of self-preservation in individuals,
is inherent in the very essence and constitution of civil society, precedes and
sustains all private rights, towards
which it may be said to stand in the relation of the keystone to thd arch. Under
this head may be classed laws which
authorize the construction of public improvements, police laws which regulate
the use of private property, so as to prevent detriment to the public morals or
safety, tax laws, which control the application of private property to the support of the government, military laws,
which sanction its appropriation to the
general defence and security. With respect to these laws, and others of a like
character, it is usually provided that
compensation shall be made to the individual specially affected, but they are
really justified as being the exercise of
a paramount and pre-existent right, and
therefore causing only damnum abzque
injuria. The same may be predicated of
a great variety of legislative acts, which
for purposes of general utility modify
the incidents of private property;
this, indeed, it is scarcely possible for

any public statute to avoid doing, in an
indirect manner at least. Thus, a law
which restricts the testamentary power,
if future in its operation, is nevertheless
perfectly constitutional, and yet it deprives every citizen, to that extent, of a
right which he previously possessed as
the owner of property.
These phrases, public use, general
utility, and the like, must be considered as indefinite (and so far objectionable) forms of expression for the
legitimate and declared objects of civil
government, as established in the particular State. Any interference with
private rights, except for the necessary
attainment of these objects, is therefore,
in so far injurious in the proper sense of
the word, as being foundedupon no paramount right. It may, of course, be also
injurious, though professedly directed
to that end, by reason of some express restriction in the constitution of
the State upon an otherwise paramount
right. Now, the power of the judiciary
to declare a law void which interferes injuriously with private rights, on one or
other ofthese grounds, maybe considered
as universally admitted under our system
of written constitutions, with its division
of political functions. But, if the decisions on this subject are examined with
care, it will be found that judges have
differed to a very embarrassing extent,
as to the exact ground on "which their
authority is to be rested. This has
probably arisen from the influence of
two conflicting theories of political government which prevail in this country.
One of these, carried to its fullest extent,
claims for the State, acting through its
different departments, absolute and despotic power, except so far as this is expressly limited by the written constitution. The other, carried to its fullest
extent, declares the State to be no more
than a political corporation, established
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like any other corporation, for*definite
ends, however exalted in their character,
and beyond these, having no just power
on the rights of individual citizens. Between these two extremes there are, of
course, a variety of shades of opinion.
Those who hold by the despotic theory,
generally look only to the express restrictions on the legislative authority.
The others regard as well the general
scope of the constitution, and the supposed purposes for which it has been
established.
It has been already observed, that in
most of the State constitutions there is
no clause which in precise terms covers
this subject. The admitted restriction
on the legislative power over private
rights, is sometimes inferred simply from
two well-known provisions, which are
usually placed in the bill of rights, as
controlling not merely the legislature,
but every function of government. .First:
That no man shall be deprived of his
property, "except by the law of the
land, or by the judgment of his peers,"
which means the same as the other form
in which it is sometimes expressed, "by
due process of law :" Case of John and
Cherry St., 19 Wend. 676; Brown vs.
Hummell, 6 Barr, 36; Dale vs. Metcalf,
9 Barr, 110. Second: That private property shall not be taken for apublic use
without compensation, from which it is
inferred that it cannot be taken in any
case for a private use. See case of Albany street, 11 Wend. 151; Sadler vs.
White, 34 Alab. 311; Clarke vs. White,
2 Swan, 549. An inference of the opposite character, that private property
might lawfully be taken for a privrateuse
without compensation, was once drawn
by Chief Justice Gibson from this very
clause, see Harvey vs. Thomas, 10 Watts,
66, and as a mere matter of verbal
logic, his conclusion was as just as the
other. But it was unnecessary for the

decision of the case before him, and has
been expressly reprobated in other cases.
Sharpless vs. The Mayor, 21 Penn. St.
167; Hays vs. Risher, 32 Penn. St. 177;
Sadler vs. White, 34 Alab. 311.
It cannot be denied, however, that desirable as it may be to extract from
these two clauses a sufficient prohibition
against legislative interference'with private rights, the task is one which involves a considerable latitude of interpretation. The first clause is simply
copied in terms or substance from
Magna Charta, where it originally stood
as a limitation on the executive power,
and it has never been supposed in England to apply practically, or otherwise
than as the solemn enunciation of a principle of abstract justice, to the legislature. Or, if the question be confined to
the mere construction of language, without regard to its historical derivation, we
make no perceptible advance. Every
statute is "the law of the land," unless
restrained by some constitutional provision; and to convert a declaration that
no man's property shall be taken except
by the law of the land, into such a restriction, is a mere paitio principii,unless
we are justified by some other constitutional principle, abstract or special, in
giving to general words a limited and
peculiar signification. It is plain, therefore, that this clause standing by itself,
amounts really to nothing. Nor are we
helped much more by the other clause
which prohibits the taking of private
property for public use without due compeasation. From these naked words,
three distinct and conflicting inferences
may be drawn with equal logical propriety: (1.) That private. property can
be taken for a private use: (2.) That it
can be taken for such use, only on compensation made: and (3.) That it cannot
be taken for such use in any case. The
first of these, which goes on the common
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lurule of construction, inclusio unius
zio alterius, met, as has been noticed, the
approbation of so sound a reasoner as
Judge Gibson. The second, which operates by way of analogy, was adopted in
Brewer vs. Bowman, 9 Geo. 37. The
third, which applies the maxim omne
najus continet in se minus, is the most
common construction. It is sufficient to
say, in respect to the last, that it also
involves apetifoprincpfii, unless we have
first established that public and private
uses stand to each other in the relation
of majus to minus, for this particular
purpose, since in themselves they are
merely correlative and co-ordinate terms,
mutually exclusive, and not in any obvious sense subordinated the one to the
other. In other words, as it is contrary
to the rules of logic to reason directly
from particular to particular, we are
thrown back on considerations of a more
general character, which must be de. duced otherwise than from the language
employed. It is the ordinary case of
statutory silence, which does not act as
its own interpreter. And finally, as the
clause is usually relegated to the bill
of rights, it creates a restriction not
only on the legislative power, but on the
judiciary and the executive. The negative inference to be drawn from it,
therefore, has no single effect, but must
be applied distributively to the subjects
of its positive prohibition. The result of
this is, that it is, a priori, impossible to
determine (even assuming that a negative inference is here admissible) which
of the functions of government it really
affects. To put this in a more tangible
shape, if the clause provided thatneither
A, B, nor C, should take private property for public uses, what positive inference could be drawn from this that B
could not take it for other uses?
But while a fair analysis of these special constitutional provisions seriously

affects the validity of the conclusions
often drawn from them, the argument
based on the general scope and purpose
of our written constitutions, as usually
framed, possesses, it is submitted, much
greater strength than is sometimes attributed to it. It is not necessary for its
application that we should adopt either
of the extreme theories as to the nature
and extent of the powers vested in the
State, which have been noticed above.
Whether these powers, taken in the aggregate, are absolute or limited, their
functions have been vested in three
distinct branches ofgovernment. By this
division of powers the function of the
legislature is as much restricted to its
appointed sphere as that of the judiciary,
or of the executive. The fallacy lies in
attributing to the first, in the absence
of any express constitutional prohibition,
the same absolute and unconditioned
power, which is supposed by some to be
vested'in the State itself, as an abstract
body. This has naturally arisen from
our familiarity with the theory of the
English Parliament, which does rightfully exercise that power to its fullest extent. But here a determination of what
constitutes the true sphere of legislative
action, must precede the discussion of
the validity of any particular statute.
That this is a task of very great difficulty there can be no doubt; but it is
an imperative oie, unless we are content
to allow the legislature to convert itself
into a practical tyranny.
For the present purpose, it is sufficient to assume, as beyond ,dispute,
that the constitutional function of the
legislature cannot coincide, to any
material extent, with that of the
judiciary; and, therefore, that to establish the possession of a particular
power by the one is to deny it to the
other. Now, one of the primary duties
of the judiciary is to determine, upon
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any given state of facts, what rule of
law is to govern the rights of individual
citizens. That this is generally done in
the course of litigious proceedings, is an
accident dependent on the mode in
which the function is exercised. The
rule itself, once ascertained, binds not
merely the parties to the suit, but the
community at large. But at any one
time, and with reference to the same
state of facts, there can be only one rule
of law applicable; what that is may be
more or less difficult of discovery, may
sometimes be mistaken, but in its essence
it is a pre-existent absolute fact, which
can be no more made otherwise than it
is, by human agency, than any other
fact belonging to the past. The function
of the judiciary is therefore the declaration of pre-existent law, and it is, ez
necessitate, an exclusive one, for if any
other body could exercise the same function, then there might be, as to the same
state of facts, two conflictingrules of law,
either co-existent, which is absurd, or
that declared by the judiciary being abrogated by the other, which would make
the judicial power a subordinate branch
of government, which it is not.
Again, legislative power, in the proper sense of the word; consists in the
authority to establish general rules of
civil conduct, and this can of necessity apply only to future transactions.
For the rights arising.out of any past
state of facts, must have become fixed
by reference to some then existing rule
of law. Now, those rights can only be
destroyed in one of two ways: either by
abolishing the existence of the rule, of
which they are the consequence, as a
historicalfact, which is impossible; or
by preventing their exercise by superior
force, which would not be an act of legislation, but of arbitrary power. In other
words, a statute which professes in terms
to take away a pre-existent right, does

not prescribe a rule of civil conduct as
such, nor establish any principle to govern the action of the individual; for
the action or conduct by which he acquired the right, being a part of the
past, is now irrevocable. Such a statute
is not really a law, but only an expression of the will of a majority in the legislature, under the pretended form of law.
If that majority be not in fact restricted
to the mere function of legislation, but
possesses arbitrary power, as is to a
great degree the case with the British
Parliament, and was in every sense so
with the French revolutionary convention, such an expression of will, whether
calling itself a law, or a decree or an
edict, would be valid and efficacious,
however objectionable on moral grounds.
But with us, to affirm the possession of
arbitrary power by the legislature beyond the limits of its special function, is
impossible. If it were so, the judiciary
and the executive would cease to be coordinate branches of government. Even
if we can attribute such power to the
State in its original and organic character, nevertheless it has chosen by the
constitution to delegate it to and divide
it between several departments, and it
would be as much a contradiction in
terms to speak of three arbitrary powers
co-existing in the same State, as of three
infinite quantities occupying the same
space. One must, ex vi tes-mini exclude
or subordinate the rest.
To sum the argument up -Every
statute which interferes with a vested
right, must do so either by the enunciation of a rule of law to be applied to a
pre-existent state of facts, which would
be an encroachment on the judicial
power; or by the arbitrary destruction
of the right itself, which could never be
a legislative act. In the one case, it
would be the excessive exercise of an
existing power; in the other, it would
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be the assumption of a power which did
not exist. In either case, the judiciary,
in the exercise of its constitutional functions, would be bound to declare what
was the proper rule of law, and to enforce practically the rights which proceed therefrom, without regard to such
an unconstitutional expression of the
legislative will.
This mode of considering the general
question, besides what seems to be its
greater logical accuracy, possesses several advantages over that which claims
to deal only with the construction of the
two special clauses above referred to.
In the first place, it deprives those
clauses of the isolated and negative character which they would otherwise possess. It enables us to define "the law
of the land," to be that rule of law
which the judicial power shall declare to
be applicable to any given state of facts.
It further explains the reason for an express prohibition against taking private
property for a public use without compensation. For every private right, as
has been al.eady said, is, from the very
constitution of society, subject to the
paramount and pre-existent right of the
State to modify or even destroy it, when
the public necessities, the attainment of
the primary ends of government, shall
require it. The exercise of this paramount right by the legislature would not
be an encroachment on the judiciary,
inasmuch as it would not be the application of a new rule of law to a previous
state of facts, but only a declaration of
the manner in which a pre-existent rule
is applied to a new state of facts. As
then, a law taking property for a public
use would not be objectionable on any
general constitutional ground, it was
proper to qualify the right by a declaration, which abstract justice required,
that the individual should in all cases
be compensated for his sacrifice for the
general good.

Again, the construction contended for
will justify more clearly an universally
admitted exception to the unconstitutionality of retrospective laws, in favor
of statutes which merely operate on
"the remedy," as it is called. The
procedure established by law to enforce
a right, is no part of the right itself,
which often exists without any practical
remedy, and most often without any
need to call on the State for active assistance. This procedure is essentially
of a transitory and prospective character; it is only the performance of the
duty of the State to give an efficient protection to civil rights. So long as that
duty is substantially performed, the
individual has no cause to complain, and
the mode, of its performance, as a matter belonging to the future, maybe varied
from time to time, at least before it has
incorporated itself with a right in proceedings actually instituted.
Finally, a number of exceptional and
at first sight, anomalous cases, some of
which will be presently mentioned, can
by this means be co-ordinated and
brought under the dominion of intelligible principles. Admitting that the
main test of the constitutionality of a
retrospective law, is, whether it avoids
interference with the judicial power, it
is plain that laws which merely confirm
antecedent rights, remove obstacles to
their just exercise, supply defects in the
procedure by which they are to be established, and in general terms substitute
an adequate for an inadequate remedy
for their enforcement, cannot be obnoxious to objection on this ground. It is
more difficult to determine to what
classes of antecedent rights those principles can properly be applied. It certainly may, to those which would have a
clear legal existence but for the positive
interference of some rule of public policy or convenience, or but for the mistake or accidental non-observance of
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such a rule. It may also apply to some
cases of rights resting in moral obligation alone, such as those arising out of
domestic relations existing de facto,
though not lawfully established, an example of which may be found in the preceding decision. But there is a large
and undefined class of cases, which deal
with rights which are purely in foro conscientis, where it must be admitted that
it is often very hard to discover any
satisfactory grounds of decision. To
take one man's property and give it to
another, merely because we think he
deserves it, may suit the character of a
beneficent khalif, but not that of a civilized legislature; and yet there are reported cases which almost seem to go
to that length. It would be impossible,
however, from want of space here, to
enter more fully on this subject. It is
sufficient to indicate lines of distinction,
which may be readily followed out by
the student for himself.
Having thus stated in a general manner the principles upon which the constitutional question has been discussed,
with more or less of clearness and consistency, we shall briefly consider some
of the instances in which they have
been practically applied by the decisions,
among which there is fortunately much
greater uniformity of result than of
theory.
It may be taken to be settled, on
whatever ground, that vested rights of
property cannot be arbitrarily destroyed
or affected by the legislature. Dash vs.
Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 505; Officer vs.
Young, 5 Yerg. 322; Hoke vs. Henderson, 4 Dev. 15; Allen vs. Peden, 2 Car.
L. Rep. 63; Dunn vs. City Council, Harper's Law, 199; Woodruff vs. State, 3
Pike, 302; Oriental Bank vs. Freese, 18
Maine, 112; Austin vs. Stevens, 24
Maine, 529; Wright vs. Marsh, 2 Greene,
Iowa, 118; Houston vs. Bogle, 10 Ired.

504; Holden vs. James, 11 Mass. 403;
Lamberton vs. Hogan, 2 Barr, 24. And
as this cannot be done directly, neither
can it be done indirectly, as by the express repeal of a statute under which
those rights are held. Benson vs. Mayor,
&c., 10 Barb. 223. Or through a legislative construction of the statute by a
subsequent declaratory.law. Hunt vs.
Hunt, 37 Maine, 334; Houston vs. Bogle,
10 Ired. 504; McLeod vs. Borroughs, 9
Georgia, 216; Wilder vs. Lumpkin, 4
Geo. 212; Dash vs. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns.
60&; Ogden vs. Blackledge, 2 Cranch,
272; West Branch Boom Co. vs. Dodge,
81 Penn. St. 285; Gordon vs. Ingram,
1 Grant's Cas. 152.
The most obvious instance of interference with vested rights would be an
act which in terms took away one man's
property to give it to another. It is
scarcely conceivable that such a statute
could be deliberately passed, without
some supposed excuse or palliation; but
if it were, it would indisputably be disregarded by the judiciary. Jackson vs.
Ford, 5 Cowen, 350; Wilkinson vs. Leland, 2 Peters. 658; Allen vs. Peden, 2
Carolina Law Rep. 63; Hoke vs. Henderson, 4 De. 15; Dunn vs. City Council, Harper, 199; Bowman vs. Middleton,
1 Bay, 254; Woodruff vs. State, 3 Pike,
305; Hoye vs. Swan & Lessee, 5 MaryL
244; White vs. White, 5 Barb. 484;
Austin vs. University of Pennsylvania, 1
Yeates, 260; Van Home's Lessee vs.
Dorrance, 2 Dallas, 304, 810; Pittsburg
vs. Scott, 1 Barr, 314; Lamberton vs.
Hogan, 2 Barr, 24; Brown vs. Hummell,
6 Barr, 86. But the same effect is often
produced by legislative acts which have
an apparent justification in the reasons
on which they are founded, and in the
ends which they propose to attain. Now,
if we eliminate those cases in which the
property is taken for a public use, or by
way of punishment for some alleged
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offence, which are governed by distinct
constitutional provision, we have left
those in which it is taken simply for
a private use. This last class of cases,
with which alone we have to deal, may
again be divided into those where the
right of property affected is absolute
and complete, and those where it is imperfect, or qualified by some antecedent
duty or obligation enforced by the statute, or where, though perfect in itself,
it happens to be vested in some one not
legally capable of exercising the usual
and necessary functions of ownership.
Taking this division as sufficiently accurate for the present purpose, it may
safely be said, in the first place, that an
act which deprived one man of an absolute and complete right for the benefit of
another, has rarely been sustained, however consonant it might seem to be under
the circumstances with abstract justice.
Thus, a statute which provides that the
executors of a tenant for life shall be entitled to claim against the remainder-men
for the value of permanent improvements
made by the former, is unconstitutional
so far as it applies to improvements
made before its passage. Austin vs. Stevens, 24 Maine, 629; see Society vs.
Wheeler, 2 Gallison, 139. So of a law
which authorizes towns to make ordinances giving liberty to all their inhabitants to pasture their cows on public
highways, the soil of which belongs to
private individuals. Woodruff vs. Neal,
28 Conn. 165. So in some of the States,
laws authorizing the taking of land for
private ways, mill dams, and the like,
have been held unconstitutional. Taylor
vs. Porter, 4 Hill, 140; Clack vs. White,
2 Swan, 549; Sadier vs. Laugham, 34
Alab. 311; see Brewer vs. Bowman, 9
Georgia, 37; contra Hickman's Case, 4
Harr. Del. 581. But in Pennsylvania,
lateral railroad laws have always been
unpported; in the later cases on the

ground that, being intended for the development of the mineral and other resources of the State, the taking of the
land under such acts was really for a
yublicuse. Harvey vs. Thomas, 10 Watts,
63 ; Harvey vs. Lloyd, 3 Barr, 331 ;
Shoenberger vs. Mulholland, 8 Barr, 154;
Hays vs. Risher, 32 Penn. St. 169. It
must be admitted, however, that the line
of distinction between public and private
uses, if this qualification were generally
adopted, would be exceedingly thin.
It is not material, in the application of
the general principle, whether the right
of property affected was originally created by contract or other act of the
party, or through the operation of some
general law which at the time regulated
the descent or transmission of property.
Where the title to land has become vested
by the death of an intestate, in his heirs,
according to the then existing law, it can
no more be livested by any general or
special legislation than if they had taken
by purchase. Thus, where a will is void
by reason of a non-compliance with some
statutory provision with respect to the
mode of its execution, it cannot be validated after the death of the testator, by
a confirmatory act, so as to vest the property in the devisees. Greenough vs.
Greenough, 1 Jones, 489; McCarty vs.
Hoffner, 23 Penn. St. 567. So where
the act makes that devisable which was
not devisable at the testator's death,
such, for instance, as rights of entry for
condition broken. Doe d. Southard vs.
Central R. R. of New Jersey, 2 Dutcher,
13; see Mullock vs. Souder, 5 Watts &
S. 198. So where a particular devise is
inoperative, by reason of incapacity in
the devisee, as in the case of a gift to an
unincorporated institution for charitable
purposes, a statutevestingthe propertyin
trustees for those purposesis void. Green
vs. Allen, 5 Humph. 170. The same
principle applies to statutes legitimating
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bastards, which, though valid during the
lifetime of the putative parent, are void
if passed after his death, so far as they
would affect the succession to his property. Norman vs. Heist, 5 Watts &
Serg. 171; and it has even been held
that it is not material that the act by
which such a result is attempted, is one
which only professes in general terms to
validate past marriages by a legislative
construction of a previous statute. Hunt
vs. Hunt, 37 Maine, 337. The status of
legitimacy or illegitimacy is determined
by the death of the parent, and cannot
be subsequently affected. Id. But
this last decision is in conflict with
the case of Goshen vs. Stonington. 4
Conn. 209, which will be subsequently
referred to.
To this class may also be referred
statutes affecting the rights of property
arising directly from the relation of husband and wife. It has therefore been
held, in some cases, that the "Married
Women" acts of several of the States,
cannot be constitutionally applied to the
rights of a husband in the real estate or
in the personal estate of his wife, whether in possession or action. Norris vs.
Boyea, 3 Kern. 288; Westervelt vs. Gregg,
2 Id. 202; Holmes vs. Holmes, 4 Barb.
295; White vs. White, 5 Barb. 484; Lefever vs. Witmer, 10 Barr, 605; Bachman
vs. Christman, 23 Penn. St. 162; Burson's Appeal, 22 Id. 166; Stehman vs.
Huber, 21 Id. 260. In other cases a
somewhat different doctrine has been
maintained. Thus, it has been held that
the legislature may constitutionally divest the contingent right of a husband in
the chose in action of his wife. Clarke
vs. McCreary, 12 Sm. & M. 347. And
su it has been held, that though a statute
cannot take away the vested rights of
dower or courtesy, it can those which
are merely inchoate. Strong vs. Clem,
12 Ind. 37. These cases cannot, how-

ever, be properly said to be conflicting,
inasmuch as the character of the maritai
rights at common law in the different
States varies very materially. Thus,
where, asin Pennsylvania and elsewhere,
the right of a husband over the choses in
action of his wife is an immediate one,
caphble of positive and efficient exercise
at any time, and in any substantial manner, and only subject, if not exercised,
to the contingency of the survivorship
of the wife, (see Hill on Trustees, 3d
Am. Ed. 619, note,) or where the title by
dower or courtesy is one which actually
and as an estate in the land commences
in the lifetime of the parties, it would
be difficult to maintain the constitutionality of a law which simply abrogated
their existence. But where, as in other
States, the marital rights become vested
only at the death of the husband or wife,
a different doctrine might very properly
obtain.
It may be observed, before leaving
this branch of the subject, that where
the natural succession to property fails
by default of those who, by reason of
blood or affinity, fall under the usual
designation of heirs, the right of the
State by way of escheat is one partaking
of the nature of sovereignty, which cannot be bound by any antecedent under..
taking. It therefore seems that where
the State, by a general law, makes a
specific disposition of property to which
it might, under such circumstances, become entitled, that disposition may afterwards be changed in any particular case
before theright underthe generallaw has
become vested by office found. This seems
to follow from the case of Gresham vs.
Rickenbacker, 28 Georgia. 227, though
the decision there is somewhat rested on
the language of the statute involved.
Passing now frbm the cases in which
the right affected was previously absolute and complete, we may consider
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briefly those in which it was already
qualified by some antecedent duty or
obligation, which the obnoxious statute
is intended to enforce. Of course, it
must be assumed that this duty or obligation was one for which originally- the
law furnished no practical remedy, else
the statute would be a mere matter of
supererogation.
Under this head may be classed those
cases where, by contract or otherwise,
and according to the very intention of
the parties, a perfect legal right would
have been created, but for an accidental
disregard or omission of some formal
statutory requisite to its juridical establishment. Thus, statutes validating
deeds, the acknowledgments of which
have been defectively certified by the
officer taking them, have been frequently
held to be constitutional, even as against
married women and their heirs. Barnet
vs. Barnet, 15 Serg. & R. 73; Tate vs.
Stoolfoos, 16 Serg. & R. 35; Watson vs.
Mercer, 8 Peters, 88, aff'd S. C. 1 Watts,
330; see observations in Menges vs.
Dentler, 33 Penn. St. 499; Chestnut vs.
Shane's Lessee, 16 Ohio, 599; Dulany
vs. Tilghman, 6 Gill & Johns. 46. After
an express decree or judgment of a court,
indeed, it has been held, in some cases,
to be different, as the matter has then
become resjudicata. Barnet vs. Barnet,
15 Serg. & P. 73; Gaines vs. Catron, 1
Hump. 84; Garnettvs. Stockton, 7 Hump.
84; but in Watson vs. Mercer, ut supr.,
it was expressly decided that the validating act might be applied to a subsequent ejectment between the same parties; and see Satterlee vs. Matthewson,
16 Serg. & R. 169, afFd 2 Peters, 413, to
the same effect. The same rule has
been applied to statutes intended to cure
a mistake in the deed of a feme covert,
as the omission of her name in the
granting part. Goshorn vs. Purcell, 11
Ohio St. N. S. 644. Or to validate the

defective exercise of a power. State vs.
The City of Newark, 3 Dutch. 196. Or
to set up and confirm .leases and other
contracts void as being against some
special rule of public policy. Satterlee
vs. Matthewson, ut supr. ; Hess vs. Werts,
4 Serg. & R. 356 ; Savings Bank vs.
Bate, 8 Conn. 505; Savings Bank vs.
Allen, 28 Id. 102. The same may be said
of statutes confirming irregular executions in favor of a purchaser. Mahler vs.
Chapman, 6 Conn. 54; Beach vs. Walker,
Id. 190; see Underwood vs. Lilly, 10
Serg. & R. 101 ; McMasters vs. Comm.,
3 Watts, 294; Willard vs. Harvey, 24 N.
H. 310. Though where a sheriff's sale
is absolutely void, so that no title whatever passes, there being no contract or
other obligation resting on the defendant, a confirmatory act will be invalid.
Dale vs. Medcalf, 9 Barr, 110; Menges vs.
Dentler, 33 Penn. St. 495. And, finally,
the general principle above stated has
been applied to acts confirming marriages
de facto, really intended to be solemnized
by the parties, but which, by mistake or
ignorance of some statutory regulation,
are void in law. Goshen vs. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209. This, it is true,
was only a settlement case; and it
appears, moreover, to be opposed by
Hunt vs. Hunt, 37 Maine, 334. But it
would seem that the doctrine of Goshen
vs. Stonington, may be supported on
the ground that the forms prescribed by
law for the solemnization of marriage
must, in general, be considered not as
belonging to the substanceof the contract,
but as establishing the legal mode of
proving it; and that if the parties really
meant marriage, and cohabited together
in good faith under that ostensible relation, an act which supplies the defect of
form should be treated as affecting only
the evidence of a right, and not the right
itself. This distinguishes the case from
that of acts legitimating bastards, where

KILLAM vs. KILLAM.
the parents never actually contemplated
marriage.
The last class of cases to which reference need be made on the present occasion, is that where a perfect legal right
to property exists in persons who, by
reason of some disability, such as that of
infancy, coverture, or lunacy, are incapable of exercising the ordinary functions
of ownership themselves, or of consenting to their vicarious exercise by others.
Statutes which, unless such circumstances authorize the sale or pledge of the
property in order to raise money for the
necessities of the real owner, or because
the property is burthensome or unproductive, have very frequently been
passed, and almost as often sustained by
the courts, at least where the application
of the money produced, as directed by
the statute, will not otherwise alter the
rights of the party. It is plain that this
does not attach any new or different
incidents to the right of property; it
merely removes a temporary bar to its
complete and beneficial enjoyment. The
disabilities we have above referred to are,
to a great degree as to their substance,
and entirely so as to their extent, the
creations of positive law; and they are
qualifications not of a right, but of the
means of its exercise, introduced from
motives of general policy, or for the protection of the individual. Their withdrawal or suspension in any particular
case, when the reason of their enforcement has ceased, is, therefore, plainly no
interference with the judicial power, and
it is, moreover, a proper legislative act,
for it is a mere modification of previous
legislation. This power of supplying the
defective capacity of its citizens, indeed,
is inherent in the State, and constitutes
what, in the Roman law, was called its
auctoritas. This in the true sense of the
word is that which auget, i. e., which

increases or supplies, the juridical
power or status which is wanting in one
not suijur&. The absolute necessity of
the existence of such a function somewhere is apparent, and though it is
usually delegated in a qualified manner
to the guardian, husband, or committee
of the person affected, it is not a natural
but a derivative power; and if derived,
as it must be, from the State alone, it
proves the antecedent existence of the
function itself as a branch of the legislative power.
-4
The questions which have arisen under
this head of our subject are of much importance, and they have given rise to
some conflict of decision. Our limits,
however, will prevent our entering upon
them here; indeed they deserve of themselves a special study. It is sufficient to
say that the general principle, as we
have just stated it, will be found to be
substantially supported by the following
among other authorities: Eslep vs.
Hutchman, 16 Serg. & R. 435; Norris
vs. Clymer, 2 Barr, 277; Sergeant vs.
Kuhn, Id. 393; Kerr vs. Kitchen, 17
Penn. St. 438; Martin's App., 23 Id. 437;
Cochran vs. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365;
Leggett vs. Hunter, 19 New York, 445;
Fowle vs. Finney, 4 Duer, 104; Blagg vs.
Miles, 1 Story, 426; Rice vs. Parkman,
16 Mass. 326; Davis vs. Johannot, 7
Metcalf, 388; Snowhill vs. Snowhill, 2
Green Ch. 20; Spotswood vs. Pendleton,
4 Call, 514; Dorsey vs. Gilbert, 11 Gill
& Johns. 87; Nelson vs. Lee, 10 B,
Monr. 495; Carrol vs. Olmsted, 16 Ohio,
251; Doe vs. Douglass, 2 Blackf. 10;
Daws vs. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316. In
Wilkinson vs. Leland, 2 Peters, 627, a
statute confirming the sale of property of
infant heirs by an executrix, in order to
pay debts of the decedent, was held valid.
But this was under an act of the Legislature of Rhode Island, which, at the
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time, had no regular constitution, and
the decision, as the enunciation of
a general principle, was dissented from,
in Jones' Heirs vs. Perry, 10 Yerg. 70,
'where a similar act was held void, on the
ground that the legislation, not being for
infant's benefit, but for the payment of
debts to be ascertained, it was an exercise of judicial power. Where the persons, whose land is to be sold, are sui
juris, however, the reason, and, therefore, the right, of legislative interference

ceases, unless in cases where their assent
is expressly shown: Ervine's Appeal, 16
Penn. St. 256; Schoenberger vs. School
Directors, 32 Penn. St. 34; Kneass' Ap.,
31 Id. 87; Powers vs. Berger, 2 Selden,
358. Though after the lapse of a 19eat
number of years, and acquiescence in a
sale made under such an act, the assent
of such persons may be presumed, at
least in a controversey between strangers: Fullerton vs. McArthur, 1 Grant's
Cas. 2'02.
H. W.

In the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, January Term,
1861.
LE BRETON VS. PEIRCE, THE OWNERS OF PROPERTY, ETC.
If the owners of property have intrusted it to an agent for a special purpose, and
the agent, in violation of his duty, has unlawfully consigned the same to be sold,
with directions to remit the proceeds to a private creditor of his own, and such
creditor, upon being informed by a letter from the consignee of the consignment
of the property and directions in reference to the same, manifests his assent
thereto by unequivocal acts, and the property is sold by the consignee, and bills
of exchange, payable to the agent's creditor or his order, are purchased with the
proceeds, and remitted in a letter addressed to him, in compliance with the
directions, and the creditor, after receiving notice of the intended remittance,
and after manifesting his assent thereto, and after the remittance is actually
made, but before it is received, learns for the first time of the manner in which
the agent became possessed of the property, and of his wrongful acts in reference to it, the original owners of the property cannot maintain an action for
money had and received against such creditor, to recover the amount collected
by him upon the bills of exchange.

This case is reported at length in the October'number of the
to which we must refer the reader. The Court,
MERRICK, J., in giving judgment, put the case mainly upon the
two points referred to in the following note, which was intended to
have been published in the same number with the case.
LAW REGISTER,

One of the questions involved in this
case is of great interest with business
men; and it seems almost incomprehen-

sible how there should have been so
much conflict in the decisions of the
courts in this country in regard to it.
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It probably may have arisen from not
clearly discriminating the precise state
of facts upon which the different views
found themselves. This will readily be
perceived by carefully examining the
opifiions of the different judges. But
we think something of this embarrassment may be got rid of by careful classification.
I. Where the negotiation of the note
or bill. as between debtor and creditor, is
understood to operate either as' conditional payment, or to create an expectation between the parties, that the collection of the principal debt shall be delayed until 'the time of payment of the
collateral security, there can be no question that, upon principle and authority,
the creditor must be said to take the
paper upon full consideration, and in
the due course of business. The conflict
in the cases seems to arise upon the
question, what is implied by accepting a
note or bill, on time, for a pre-existing
debt then due?
1. This will depend, to some extent,
upon commercial usage, and the ordinary
course of doing business, and the natural implications, from the mere act of
accepting the note or bill, and is, therefore, matter of fact, in part, at least.
The implication, as matter of fact, is different, in some respects, whether the new
note or bill is for the precise amount of
the existing debt, as in Michigan State
Bank vs. The Estate of Leavenworth, 28
Vert. R. 209; or for a different sum,
either more or less, and especially when
it is for a less sum. Where the new security is for the precise sum of the debt,
and is payable on time, there is, in fact, a
very strong implication that the creditor
will wait until the maturity of the new
security. And in that view the cases all
agree that the new security is taken for
value, and that all equities in favor of
other parties will be excluded. And a

similar implication results where the new
security is for a larger sum than the
existing debt, as in Atkinson vs. Brooks,
26 Vert. R. 569.
2. But where the security is of a different character from the original debt,
as where the creditor takes a mortgage
from the debtor for the payment of the
sum due in six months, .it is not understood there is any implication of a contract to delay the collection of the debt
of other parties: United States ws.
Hedge, 6 How. U. S. R. 279.
3. And where the new security is not
given in lieu. or on account of the existing debt, but as a mere pledge, the title
of the new security remaining in the
debtor, and not passing to the creditor,
thus making the creditor the mere trustee or agent of the debtor for the collection of the new security, to be applied,
when collected, upon the existing debt,
between them, as was held in the case
of Austin vs. Curtis, 31 Vt. R. 64; the
cases all agree that there is no implied
undertaking not to collect the existing
debt in the mean time.
The following cases may therefore be
regarded free of doubt, both upon principle and authority:
1. If the collateral is given in security
at the time the debt is created, and as an
inducement for the credit, and is a negotiable instrument, and still current, and
is, in fact, negotiated to the creditor, so
as to make him a party to the paper,
and impose upon him the duty of demand and notice, according to strict
commercial usage, the cases all agree,
so far as they have comprehended the
questions involved, that all equities of
third parties are excluded: Chickopee
Bank vs. Chapin, 8 Met. R. 40; Griswold vs. Davis, 31 Vt. R. 390; Palmer
vs. Richards, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 529.
The declaration in Williams vs. Little, 11
New H. 66, and many other cases to the
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contrary, is certainly not maintainable
upon any fair view of the question, in
that precise form of it.
2. If the collateral is not so negotiated as to make the creditor a party to
the paper, and thus impose upon him
the duty of making demand and giving
notice, but making the creditor the mere
agent of the debtor for the collection of
the new bill or note, there is no ground
of excluding equities in other parties,
unless the creditor negotiates the security thus left in his hand to some
third party, for value and while current:
Palmer vs. Richards, 1 Eng. L. & Eq.
R. 529; Atkinson vs. Brooks, 26 Vert.
R. 569; De La Chaumette vs. Bank of
England, 9 B. & C. 208; Allen vs. King,
4 McLean R. 128.
In such case the debtor, it would seem,
may recall his collaterals, as the creditor, being his agent, is under his control. But this is certainly not the ordinary case of collateral security.
3. Where there is either an express
contract with the creditor, that he shall,
in consideration of the indorsement of
the new bill, or note, as collateral, delay
the collection of the existing debt until
the maturity of the new security; or
where such an understanding is reasonably to be presumed, from the facts and
circumstances attending the transaction,
and the delay is thereby obtained. there
is no ground of question, since they stand
upon the same footing in point of principle, as if an advance were made upon
the credit of the new security: Okie vs.
Spencer, 2 Wharton, 253; S. C., 2 Am.
Lead. Cas. 232, and numerous cases
there cited. These cases are so obvious
upon principle, to the mind of all lawyers, that it would be a useless labor to
attempt to render them more perspicuous. What is self-evident thereby becomes incapable of simplification, since

there is nothing more obvious by which
it can be illustrated.
I. In coming to the inquiry, what is
the precise legal implication, from the
mere fact of receiving a negotiable security without surrendering any of the
former securities for an existing debt,
we encounter more perplexity.
1. This will depend, undoubtedly, to
a great extent upon the course of doing
business, and the commercial usages of
the place. From all we can learn of this
commercial usage in England, judging
both from the reported cases and the elementary works, we infer that each new
security is there credited as so much
cash at the time it is received, and is
charged to the debtor, in case of dishonor, with the addition of expenses attending the protest: Poirier vs. Morris,
20 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 103; Bosanquet vs.
Dudman, 1 Starkie, 1. In this last case
Lord Ellenborough said, "that whenever
the acceptances exceed the cash balance
the plaintiff holds all the collateral bills
for value :" Ex parte Pease, 19 Vesey,
25. In this mode of transacting business,
the new notes, or bills, from time to time
remitted to the creditor by his debtor,
are, upon receipt, passed to his credit,
and thus virtually discounted. This, we
apprehend, is the usual course of doing
business, in this country, where one has
an open account with banks or bankers,
and not unfrequently with brokers. How
far it obtains with merchants it is not
very certain, depending upon the nature
and the amount of the dealings. But
whenever the business is conducted in
this form, there would be no difference
as to the right of the creditor to hold the
collaterals, whether they were taken in
payment, or as security, or whether any
advances in money were made at the
precise time the collaterals were negotiated, since passing them to the credit of

-
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the debtor as so much money, is strictly
advancing the money upon them. This,
we apprehend, is the true explanation of
the reason why we find so little said, in
the English cases, or treatises on bills
and notes, in regard to these distinctions,
which occupy so much space in our own
reports. The case of The Bank of the
Metropolis vs. The New England Bank,
1 How. U. S. R. 234, is precisely of this
character, and the creditor was allowed
to hold the collaterals free from all
equities.
2. But in whatever mode the business
is transacted, if we look carefully into
the true principles involved, we shall
come much to the same result. It has
always seemed to us that most of the
controversy upon this subject has grown
out of the different sense in which the
terms used are understood. If the term
"collateral" is understood to import that
the bills thus held are not taken on account of the existing debt, but only to
be held until due, and, if paid, the
amount to be applied, and, in the mean
time, the creditor assumes no responsibility in regard to them, exceptas the
mere agent of the debtor for collection,
there could be no ground of claim that
any property passed, or that existing
equities in former parties were extinguished. The English cases in bankruptcy show very clearly that, in such
cases, the title in the bills does not pass
to the assignee, but may be retained by
the correspondent: Ex parte Pease, 19
Vesey, 25 ; De La Chaumette vs. The
Bank of England, supra.
3. But we apprehend this is not the
ordinary acceptance of the term collateral, or collateral security; for it is no
securit at all. The etymology of collateral security indicates that it is something running along with, and, as it were,
parallel to, something else, of a similar
character. It is collateral to the origi-

nal indebtedness. It is, of course, a security, but it need not be in the precise
form of the original. A bond may be
secured by a collateral indebtedness in
the form of a bill or note, and vice versa,
and the collateral will always include
other parties. But as far as the debtor
is concerned, they are holden for the
payment of the debt, and the creditor
equally at liberty to pursue allin all
legal modes, unless thereis some express
or implied restriction upon the title of
the collaterals.
In this sense the title passes, by the
negotiation of a bill or note, as collateral, the same as if the money were advanced. The only difference is, that
this form is dispensed with, and the
creditor retains his original security.
Ordinarily, the collateral may not bind
the same parties as the original security,
or not all of them. In such cases the
creditor will wish to retain the original,
so as to lose none of his security. All
that the word collateral imports is, that
there is a prior or existing debt, and
the collateral depends upon that, stands
or falls with it, so far as the creditor is
concerned.
4. But if the party takes the indorsement of a bill of lading, or of a bill of
exchange, or note, he acquires no different rights as to the parties to these new
instruments, whether he takes them inpayment, or as collateral to an existing
debt. In either case he becomes a party
to the transaction or contract to the fullest extent, and, in the case of negotiable
instruments, is bound to pursue the law
merchant in making demand and giving
notice, at the peril of making them his
own, in actual exoneration of the party
negotiating them.
5. In such cases it can be of little
importance whether the original debt is
treated as extinguished or not, since, if
the debtor negotiate the note or bill, by
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his own indorsement, which is the usual ment of the antecedent debt, is quite
course, he is bound by such indorse- immaterial." And Lord Campbell said:
ment, and the double bond is of no es- "There is nothing to make a difference
sential importance. And if the creditor between this and the common case,
do not take steps to charge his debtor, where a bill is taken as security for a
as indorser, he makes the collateral his debt, and in that case an antecedent
own in payment of his debt, and the re- debt is a sufficient consideration." And
sult is the same, whether he is bound in Percival vs. Frampton, 2 C. M. & R.
doubly or singly, since the release extin- 180, Parke, B., said: "If the note were
guishes both or one, as the case may be. given to the plaintiffs as security for a
6. The mere giving of a negotiable previous debt, and they held it as such,
note or bill for an existing debt, is only they might be properly stated to be
conditional payment, in any case, by the holders for valuable consideration." The
general law merchant, unless there is an same rule is recognised in numerous
express agreement that it shall extin- other English cases: Heywood vs. Watguish the original debt. Upon the dis- son, 4 Bing. R. 496; Bosanquet vs.
honor of the now note or bill, the creditor Forster, 9 C. & P. 669 ; Same vs. Corser,
may sue the original debt, or the indorser ib. 664; 2 Am. Lead. Cas. 250, 251. The
of the new bill or note, at his election, so rule is thus stated in the work last quothat the note or bill is but a collateral in ted, which has almost become a book of
any case, unless there is some special authority in the American courts. ",The
contract, or some special usage, as in the result of the English cases would seem
New England States, that the acceptance to be, that accepting a note or bill payof the new note, or bill, shall, prima able at a future day, on account of a
facie, extinguish the debt. These pro- pre-existing debt, will suspend the debt
positions are familiar, and scarcely re- until the note reaches maturity: Byles
quire specific authority for their sup- on Bills, 6 ed. 304." "The law is clear,"
port. The cases are carefully collated, said Lord Kenyon, in Stedman vs. Groch,
in 2 Am. Lead. Cas. 241-273.
1 Esp. R. 4, "that if in payment of a
III. Most of the conflict in the Ameri- debt the creditor is content to take a bill
can cases, and all the English cases, will or note payable at a future day, he canbe readily reconciled by reference to the not legally commence an action for his
foregoing distinctions. And those ano- original debt, until such note or bill bemalous cases in the American States, comes payable, and default is made in
which will not come into these distinc- the payment." And the cases all agree
tions harmoniously, have" been decided that no recovery can be had in any case,
without properly apprehending the true upon the original debt, where the collaprinciples involved, and must be left in teral, given in security, was indorsed
their appropriate solitude until they are while current, and is still outstanding:
either abandoned, or else the course of Price vs. Price, 16 M. & W. 232, 243.
business, or the principles of natural And in every case where the party acjustice become so far modified, that cepts a collateral as security for a prethey can be adopted by others.
vious debt then due, there is no implied
1. In the case of Poirier vs. Morris, obligation not to negotiate the collateral
supra, Crompton, J., said z"Whether the before maturity. In nine cases out of ten
bill was a collateral security, or whether that is done, among business men immeit had the effect of suspending the pay- diately, for the purpose of raising the
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money, which should have been paid
when the debt matured; so that the collateral is always received for the ease of
the debtor, and it is not ordinarily received as a mere pledge, so that negotiating
it would be a breach of good faith. On
the contrary, the security, being negotiable, passes as money, and operates as
payment conditionally, and is expected
to be passed into the market at once.
All that is implied, then, by it being
collateral, is, that there is no agreement
or implication that the original debt is
extinguished. The creditor intends to
hold on to his original debt and all other
securities. The new security, then, is
collateral to the previous debt; but the
new security, as between the parties to
it, and the creditor, is not affected by it
being collateral to the previous debt, any
differently from what it would be if it
were received in extinguishment of it.
It is negotiated in the fullest manner,
and subject to the law merchant, and
with no restrictions upon its further negotiation. We think, therefore, that the
English courts have taken the true view
in saying that such paper passes for
value, and in the ordinary course of
business, and excludes all existing equities, without regard to the understanding, agreement, or implication, as matter of fact, that the creditor should delay
the enforcement of the existing debt until
the maturity of the new security. And
that they are also right in saying, that
it makes no difference in principle, or
legal effect, whether the existing debt is
extinguished or not, or whether the original evidence of debt, or the existing
securities, are surrendered or not:
Kearslake vs. Morgan, 5 Term R. 513;
Baker vs. Walker, 14 M. & W. 465 ; Belshaw vs. Bush, 11 C. B. 191, 200; Ford
vs. Beech, 11 Q. B. 852, 873. These transactions, indorsing negotiable securities
on account of previous dobts, without

special agreeement as to the effect, are
there treated as "necessary exceptions to
the general rules of law, in favor of the
This rule has been
law merchant."
adopted in this country by the national
tribunal of last resort: Swift vs. Tyson,
16 Pet. R.1. This decision was made upon
the maturest consideration, and has prevailed in most of the States, and is expressly extended to collaterals: Bank of
the Metropolis vs. New England Bank,
supra;Petrie vs. Clark, 11 Serg. & R. 377,
as early as 1824 adopts almost precisely.
the-same view, except that it is not assumed, as matter of necessary implication, that one who accepts security for a
debt will, to some extent, change his conduct in consequence. See also Walker
vs. Geisse, 4 Wharton, 252. In Holmes
vs. Smith, 16 Maine, 177, it is decided
that where negotiable paper is taken in,
payment of a previous debt, it will exclude all equities in other parties. To
the same extent is Williams vs. Little,,
supra. The same view is adopted in
Carlisle vs. Wishart, 11 Ohio, 172; Norton vs. Waite, 20 Maine, 175; Bostwick
vs. Dodge, 1 Doug. Mich. R. 413; Bush
vs. Peckard, 3 Harrington R. 385; Brush
vs. Scribner, 11 Vionn. R. 388; Barney
vs. Earle, 13 Alabama R. 106. In these
cases, except Williaims vs. Little, the
question did not arise in regard to negotiable paper being taken as collateral
security. But in many of the States, as
well as in Swift vs. Tyson, and The Bank
of the Metropolis vs. The New England
Bank, supra, all such distinction is disclaimed, and held to have no existence in
principle. Reddick vs. Jones, 6 Iredell,
107; Gibson vs. Conner, 3 Kelley, 47;
Valette vs. Mason, 1 Smith 89, (Indiana);
Allaire vs. Hartshorn, 1 Zabriskie, 665;
Blanchard vs. Stevens, 3 Cush. R. 162.
The fallacy of supposing that the creditor
is in the same condition after having
failed to enforce the collection of his col-
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laterals, as if he had not'received them,
is here placed in the clearest light by
Dewey, J.: "If the party had not received the note as collateral security, he
might have pursued other remedies to
enforce the security or payment of his
debt. He might have obtained other securities, or, perhaps, payment in money.
It is a fallacy to say, that if the plaintiffs are defeated in their attempt to enforce the payment of these notes, they
are in as good a situation as they would
have been if the notes had not been
transferred to them. That fact is assumed not proved, and from the very
nature of the case is matter of entire uncertainty. The convenience and safety
of those dealing in negotiable paper
seem to require and justify the rule that
when a person takes a negotiable note
not overdue, or apparently dishonored,
and without notice, actual or constructive, of want of consideration, or other
defence thereto, whether in payment of
a precedent debt, or as collateral security for a debt, the holder would have
the legal right to enforce the same
againstthe parties thereto, notwithstanding such defence might not have been
effectual as between the original parties."
And the Supreme Court of Rhode Island,
after very careful and thorough examination of the cases, have recently come
to the same conclusion: Bank of the Republic vs. Carrington, 5 R. I. R. 515; see
also Atkinson vs. Brooks, 26 Vt. R. 569.
It scarcely seems necessary to enumerate
the cases in New York and some other
States which have followed their lead,
where it has been held that paper negotiated as collateral on account of a previous debt, is not taken for value and is
subject to all equities. We think it most
unquestionable that the New York courts
are right in saying there is no distinction, in principle, between taking such
paper in payment and as collateral

to a pre-existing debt. But the truth
undoubtedly is, that either forms a
good consideration, and the title of the
creditor depends upon the character of
the paper, and is an exception to all
rules attaching to the delivery of other
property as security for a debt.
The main point of the decision in the
very case before us, that the trust, which
unquestionably attached to the property
which formed the consideration of the
bills, could not attach to the bills after
they had been bona fide negotiated in
the market, although merely between
debtor and creditor, and no new advance
made specifically on such account, goes
exclusively upon the peculiar quality
and character of negotiable paper as to
the transmission of its title. It passes
in the market as money. No man is
bound to make any inquiry into the title
of the holder. And even carelessness,
short of bad faith, will not defeat one's
title to such paper, taken for value:
Goodman vs. Harvey, 4 Ad. & Ellis,
870, overruling Gill vs. Cubit, 3 B. &
Cr. 466. And whether one advances
money and then takes the money in payment of his debt, or takes the note
or bill on account of the debt, or as collateral security, is not material, either
in fact or in law. And, to be consistent,
we must either adopt the New York rule
that, in both cases there is no value
given for the new note or bill, or else
insist that value is given in both cases.
It is impossible, as it seems to us, to
successfully contend .for the contrary,
unless where the previous debt is not
due, or the new security is such that no
trust is reposed in it, and these are
exceptional cases. In every other case,
the creditor will conduct differently on
account of the new security, and will delay the collectioZ of the previous debt
until the result of the new security is
determined. And then it is impossible
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to restore the creditor to his former position, since time is a very important
matter in commercial transactions. We
trust that, before many years, all our
American courts will adopt the sensible
views of the English courts upon this
question, and not expend so much
strength hereafter in determining the
precise difference between receiving a
note or bill "on account of," "in payment of," "as collateral to," and "as
security for" an existing debt, since no

one, whose perceptions were not rendered very acute by the study of refinements and hair-breadth distinctions,
would ever dream that there could be
any essential difference in the rights of
the creditor to have the full benefits of
the new securities, and of "all the collaterals," in the language of Lord Ellenborough in Bosanquet vs, Dudman, supra,
until he obtained full satisfaction of his
debt.
I. F. R.

In the Court of Common -Pleasof Brie County, Pennsylvania.
WALLACE ET AL. VS. WALLACE ET AL.
I. A will which authorizes executors not only to sell at their option, but also to
make valuation, division, and allotments of the estate devised, and to make deeds
of conveyance therefor, breaks the descent, and vests the estate in the executors,
and the heir at law cannot maintain ejectment therefor.
2. Where a plaintiff in ejectment claims, not as heir at law, but as devisee under a
will which authorizes the executors not only to sell, but also to make a valuation
and allotment of the estate devised, she must show that these provisions of the
will have been complied with, so that her portion or purpart may be known and
distinguished from that of other devisees mentioned in the will.
3. When an estate is devised to trustees, they to pay over or convey to the cestui
gue trust the one-half part of what they should receive of the estate, and the
yearly proceeds of the other half during her natural life, the trustees are the
repository of the title for her benefit, and she cannot maintain ejectment for it.
4. If executors or trustees, created by a will, are authorized to make division and
allotment of real estate, and neglect or refuse to do it, the remedy for the cestui
qu use is in the Orphans' Court.

This was an action of ejectment for about 4000 acres of land in
Erie county, .brought by Elizabeth Wallace and J. W. Wall, trustee
of Elizabeth Wallace, against John William Wallace and others,
No. 149, of May Term, 1860, in the Court of Common Pleas of
Erie county, Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs, to sustain their action,
.offered in evidence a copy of the will of Mrs. Tace Wallace, dec'd,
late of Burlington, New Jersey, from the Prerogative Court of said
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State. Defendants objected to the evidence because it was not properly certified; the court sustained the objection and rejected the
evidence. The defendants, however, waived the informal certificate,
and it was again offered, when it was again objected to, for the
reasons hereafter mentioned in the opinion of the court; so much
of the will, dated July 1821, as is of importance to this case, is as
follows, to wit:
"2. Whereas several of my children, by deed dated the 2d July,
1819, did grant and convey to me all their share and interest in
the property and estate of theirfather, I direct my executors hereinafter named, as soon as conveniently may be, to make an estimate
of all the property which I have, or may be entitled to, as well
under the said deed as otherwise, and then I direct the whole to be
divided into six equal parts."
Here follow several specific legacies, and then:
"6. One other equal and sixth part I give and devise to my
daughter, Elizabeth Wallace, her heirs and assigns: Provided,that
as my said daughter.Elizabeth did not join in the said deed of the
2d of July, 1819, and will therefore be entitled to receive some portion of herfather's estate, it is my will and intention, that whatever
amount she shall receive therefrom shall be deducted from the said
sixth part devised to her, and the shares so arranged as that they
may be all thus equalized, and all the said girls receive an equal
amount from the estate of their saidfather and my estate together."
On the 26th February, 1823, a codicil was added to this will, in
which was contained the following: "I direct my estate and the
proceeds of such part or parts as shall be sold, to be divided into
four parts instead of six, and one-fourth to each of my daughters,
as in my said will is directed as to one-sixth; subject to the deductions and provisions therein stated." * * * "And I direct that the
act of a majority of my executors shall be binding on the rest, and
as valid and effectual as if done by all. And I authorize my executors, or a majority of them, to sell any part of my said estate they
may think proper. And the valuation, division, and allotment of
my said estate, and its proceeds, I direct to be made by my executors,
or a majority of them, or by such person or persons as they shall
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call in for that purpose, and the deed of conveyance of the executors,
or a majority of them, to make and create a good, sufficient. and
valid title and estate."
On the 18th day of March, 1826, testatrix added the following
codicil to her will:
"I hereby republish all the foregoing as my last will and testament, except as hereinafter excepted, that is to say, I revoke so
much thereof as makes my daughters, Rachel and Elizabeth, to be
executors, declaring that my sister, Mrs. Susan V. Bradford, my
daughter Mary, and my son-in-law, Mark W. Collet, to be my
executors; and if either or any of 'them refuse to act, then the
other or others to be so, giving to them and to survivors, and survivors of them, all the power hereinbefore and above stated; the
majority having power to act, as before stated. And in regard
to the bequest which 1 have herein made to my daughter -Elizabeth,
instead of giving and devising to herself, as hereinbefore stated, I
devise and bequeath what is devised and bequeathed to her, to
Dr. Nathan W. Cole and Mark W. Collet, their heirs and assigns,
and to the survivors of them, and the heirs and assigns of the
survivor, and if either refuse to accept, to the other, his heirs and
assigns in trust, that they pay over, or convey to her the onehalf part of what they shall receive therefrom, absolutely in fee,
and to her own disposal, and that the other half they retain and
pay to her the yearly interest and revenue and profits arising
therefrom (after deducting charges and expenses,) during her natural
life, and after her death, that they shall hold the same in trust
for such children of my late son, Joshua W. Wallace, Junr., as
shall be alive at the time of my decease, share and share alike;
and if any of them die before the age of twenty-one years, the
share of such to go to the survivors or survivor, and that the said
moiety so held in trust may produce a revenue and interest, I authorize the said trustees, or whichever may act, and the survivor
of them, and the heir and assigns of the survivor, to sell, lease, or
otherwise dispose of the same, either for cash or credit, or any
part or parts thereof, and the proceeds thereof, to invest in any
such way as they may think proper, to be by them held on the same
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trusts and with the same power as at first, and so toties quoties;
but it is to be entirely at the discretion of the trustees or trustee
for the time being, whether they or he will sell or not, and how
and upon what terms, and how they or he will invest without the
direction or control of the cestui que trust; and the said trustee or
trustees are to settle with my executors what is the share or portion
thus devised, and their or his acquittance, exonerate or discharge
the executors without the cestui que trust."
John P. Vincent and Wilson Laird, for plaintiffs.
Bon. Gaylord Church, James C. ltHarshall, John Win. Wallace,
and Benjamin Grant, for defendants.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
DERRIcKSoN, J.-The plaintiffs have offered in evidence, as the
basis of their right of action, the will of Mrs. Tace Wallace, and
the defendants (waiving the incompleteness of its authentication)
object to its reception for the purpose for which it is offered, "because it vests no title in the plaintiffs, or either of them, nor gives
them such possession or right of possession as will entitle them to
maintain their ejectment."
If the right to recover depended alone on the will without the
codicils, it would doubtless be complete as to one of the plaintiffs,
but unfortunately for him, a codicil was appended, which authorized the executors not only to sell at their option, but also to make
valuation, division, and allotments "of the estate devised, and deeds
of conveyance therefor." While, therefore, Miss Wallace has an
interest in the will of her mother, it is still quite evident she has
not such an one as will entitle her to maintain an ejectment for
the land covered by it, because it is vested in the executors, though
for special purpose. The title could not vest in the executors and
the cestuis que use at the same time, and the plaintiffs claim by
virtue of the will, she cannot claim superior to it. The line of
descent was broken by the will, and she claims not as heir at law,
but as devisee. To entitle her to succeed, she must show that the
terms or provisions of the will have been complied with in the
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valuation, division, and allotment of the estate, so that her portion
or purpart might be known and distinguished from that of,the
other devisees mentioned in the will. But this has not been done.
This, of itself, would warrant the rejection of the will. But there
is another reason therefor. By a subsequent codicil, the testator
devises the share previously given to her daughter Elizabeth
directly, to trustees, in trust, they pay over or convey to her the
one-half part of what they should receive of the estate, and the
yearly proceeds of the other half during her natural life. This
codicil clearly takes away her title to the estate devised, and she
can have none in it but through the'trustees. They are the repository of the title, though for her benefit, and there it remains
until it is properly divested. Has this been done? It is not even
alleged that it has been, and we cannot here go into an investigation to ascertain what proportion of the land in controversy, if
any, would belong to Miss Wallace. The Orphans' Court is the
proper place for this should the executors and trustees decline the
execution of their duties. Had action been taken in either way,
and the apportionate allotments been made, the plaintiffs, or Miss
Wallace alone, might be entitled to recover; but claiming, as she
does, exclusively under the will, it would be useless to receive it in
evidence, and then have to tell the jury that it vested, per se, no
such right in her as would entitle her to recover. The introduction
of Mr. Wall's name as a co-plaintiff and trustee of the other, gives
no additional right to recover, as he is not named in the will, nor
is there any evidence of his right to act in either capacity.
For these and other reasons, equally obvious, the objection is
sustained, and the evidence rejected.

BROUNER vs. GOLDSMITH.

Tn the New York Supreme Court, General Term.

Fifth j)istrict.

BROUNER V8. GOLDSMITH ET AL.
When the plaintiff in the course of a trial calls out the declarations of the defendant, it does not follow, that all that was said by defendant can be given in evidence, but only that which tended to qualify that given in evidence by the
plaintiff, and no more.

Appeal by the plaintiffs from a judgment entered after a trial at
the Circuit with a jury. It appeared in evidence that the plaintiff
took a claim of the defendants against Adler & Garson, to collect
and have one-third realized, and after the claim had been sued by
the plaintiff, the defendants compromised the claim with Adler &
Garson, and discharged them without plaintiff's consent. The
defendants denied making any such contract with the plaintiff.
On the trial the plaintiff tendered a witness to show that the defendants compromised with Adler & Garson, and the defendants
called for all that was said upon that occasion, including what was
said about the commission, and also what was said about the conditions upon which the plaintiff took the claim for collection. The
plaintiff was not present. The Court received the evidence, and
the plaintiff excepted, and the defendants had a verdict, and the
plaintiff appealed.
G. N. Jennedy, for plaintiff.
N. F. Grave8, for defendants.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
ALLEN, J.-I am of opinion that the Justice erred in admitting
evidence of the declarations of -defendants at the time they settled
the debt against Adler & Garson.
The plaintiff had not called for any declaration of the defendants on that occasion. They had proved a fact, to wit, the compromise and discharge of the debt, and it would probably have been
competent for defendants to prove what was said concerning the
settlement, and so much of the conversation as made a part of the
negotiation as a part of the re8 gesta, and to show what was done;
and had the plaintiff called for any part of the conversation, the

